At different times in the conflict each of these groups made effective line crossers. Chinese and North Korean defectors in military uniform were often used as line crossers. Young, healthy men were in danger of being forcibly conscripted into the North Korean Army if caught in the enemy rear area. Women, often with young children or babies, proved to be very effective agents, as did older males. On the United Nations’ side, these “line crossers” were exclusively Korean or Chinese because a Caucasian would have no chance of keeping his identity secret. During the Korean War, both sides depended on infiltrating agents to gather this information. Timely and accurate intelligence of the composition and disposition of the enemy is a crucial component of conducting combat operations. Later on the TLO program augmented their efforts. combat divisions initially depended on combat patrols and their own agent programs. For the acquisition of battlefield intelligence at the tactical and operational level, the U.S. With the start of the war, the KLO remained the primary agency for gathering intelligence at the strategic level.
Finnegan, “The Evolution of US Army HUMINT Intelligence Operations in the Korean War,” Studies in Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency Study, 1985, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1992), 46-48.Ģ Schnabel, 64 John P. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, Policy and Direction: The First Year. Throughout the war, the KLO provided strategic intelligence for FEC, primarily by inserting agents deep behind enemy lines.ġ James F. 2 At the start of the war, the KLO was virtually the only operational human intelligence asset in Korea. Willoughby, established the Korea Liaison Office (KLO) to gather intelligence about North Korea. 1 Prior to the war, the G-2 (security) of FEC, Major General Charles A. Since its inception, General Douglas MacArthur commanded FEC as well as being “dual-hatted” as the commanding general of the U.S. Established after World War II, FEC was a joint headquarters located in the Dai’ichi Building in Tokyo, Japan. Military operations on the Korean peninsula were the responsibility of the United States Far East Command (FEC). This article will examine the role of the organization tasked with conducting the gathering of tactical intelligence, the Tactical Liaison Office (TLO), and the experiences of the Special Forces soldiers serving with the TLO. The second mission Special Forces soldiers participated in involved the handling of agents sent behind enemy lines to gather tactical intelligence. Some of the Special Forces troops were assigned to work with the North Korean partisan units conducting raids behind the enemy lines from bases on the islands off the coast of Korea. Sent to Korea in 1953 in the late stages of the war, Special Forces soldiers participated in two distinct unconventional warfare operations. The Korean War (1950–1953) was the first combat employment of Special Forces.
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